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I. INTRODUCTION
The body of law which has become the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law was first
enacted by the Idaho Legislature in 1917. Prior to that time, no insurer offered the worker's
compensation coverage which Idaho employers were required to secure. To address this
situation, the Legislature created the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter the "SIF").
Much has changed since then but some things have remained unchanged. Among the
things that have changed: in 1971, the Legislature relieved the SIF from the financially
burdensome role of insurer of last resort through the creation of the "assigned risk pool." See,
LC. § 72-322. 1
Among the things that have not changed are the substantive provisions of the statute at
issue in this case, which pertains to the distribution of dividends, LC. § 72-915. 2 From its
adoption in 1917, LC. § 72-915 has afforded the Manager, upon finding that excess premiums
have been collected (on an aggregate balance) which he concludes can be "safely and properly
divided" with the discretion to decide whether to distribute an aggregate balance. Plaintiffs'
submit that if a dividend is to be paid the statute sets out a precise proration formula dictating

how to distribute the balance among all of the time-qualified policyholders.

1

Inexplicably, despite this clear expression of legislative intent to relieve the SIF of the
burdensome role of "insurer of last resort,'' the SlF has proceeded with an underwriting policy that
includes coverage for many high risk employers. See, Appellees' Briefp. 2. Having thus needlessly
exposed itself to high risk policies, the SIF asserts that maintenance of this underwriting policy is a part
of the justification for the Court to rewrite the statute at issue in this case so that the SIF can manipulate
the dividend allocation system in a manner which will allow it to compete for higher premium lower risk
policies. Appellees' Brief at p.29
2

The statute has changed over the years only to accommodate the changes in the proscribed
management structure of the fund - e.g. manager to commission and back to manager.
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The Manager and the Board have considered it convenient and appropriate to ignore this
language. Consequently, the SIF, for at least the several years at issue here, has chosen to
distribute the available funds only among approximately 25% of the SIF's time qualified
policyholders.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The resolution of this appeal turns upon the following question:
Did the 1917 Legislature intended to confer discretion only over
the question of whether to declare a dividend and then to direct
how to distribute that dividend or, alternatively, did the Legislature
intended to also confer discretion over the "how to?"
Plaintiffs' claim may be simply put. They contend that the language ofI.C. § 72-915
clearly expresses the intent for the Manager to have discretion over the decision of whether to
issue a dividend but equally clearly provides that once he makes this discretionary determination,
his discretion is at an end. Once the Manager chose to distribute an aggregate balance as a
dividend, he has been directed by the Legislature to distribute it to specifically identified
policyholders (each individual time-qualified policyholder) in proportion to his prior paid
premiums. If Plaintiffs are correct, the matter should be remanded for further proceedings in the
District Court to determine the amount of damages due to the class.
The SIF's positions cannot be so easily summarized. Most of these positions and the
underlying "facts" are irrelevant to the question to be resolved in this appeal. Those that are
relevant are neither plausible nor supported by cited authority. At its core, the syllogism upon
which the SIF builds its entire position is as follows:
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Major Premise:

The Manager has been given and in fact needs to have a lot of discretion in
order to fulfill his statutory responsibility to manage the Fund.

Minor Premise:

Reading the balance allocation provisions of I. C. § 72-915 as directing that
the balance be divided as any other dividend - to each policyholder
propo1iional to the amount of premiums paid - would be a limit on the
Managers discretion.

Ergo:

LC. § 72-915 cannot be read to direct that each policyholder receive a
dividend proportional to the amount of premiums paid but rather should be
read as granting the Manager discretion over "how to" distribute the
available funds.

If the SIF is correct, which Plaintiffs do not concede, then at least a remand for further
proceedings in the District Court to determine if an abuse of discretion has occurred and, if so, to
determine damages.
The defect in the SIF's logic lies in its major premise. The Manager has not been given
and could not be given total control of every decision and matter affecting the Fund. The
Legislature has always had the final say. It could dictate a particular procedure as it has done
from the outset in I.C. § 72-915 and it can take away powers as it did when it removed
rate-making from the powers of the Manager with the passage ofI.C. § 41-1618. In the end, it
really does not matter how much the Manager wants a power or how having it might allow him
to manage the fund differently. What matters - and all that matters - is whether the Legislature, in
this case the l 917Legislature, intended to give or withhold the power at issue.
B.

NO CASE DECIDED BY THIS COURT SUPPORTS A DETERMINATION
THAT THE MANAGER HAS DISCRETION OVER THE PROPORTIONING
OF ANY AGGREGATE BALANCE WHICH HE HAS CHOSEN TO
DISTRJBUTE

The language of the statute clearly states that once the Manager has determined that there
is an aggregate balance which may be safely and properly distributed, he has the discretion to
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decide whether to declare a dividend. This Court has held that this discretion over whether to
declare a dividend is broad. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399,
111 P.3d 73, 84 (2005). The Court in Hayden Lake did not hold, and it has never held, that this
responsibility is without limits.
At no point in this matter has either party challenged this reading of the statute. Hayden
Lake would not warrant comment but for the fact that the SIF extensively discussed it, apparently

in support of the claim that LC. § 72-915 should be read in connection with the other provisions
of Title 72, Chapter 9, as intending to afford the Manager discretion over how to distribute an
aggregate balance. Appellees' Brief, pp. 22-28. This reliance upon a case which had nothing to
do with the construction of LC.§ 72-915 and which never discussed the presence or absence of
discretion over "how to" proportion a balance, appears to be based upon a myopic reading of
Roberts .v Transportation Department, 121 ldaho 727,827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App.1991), aff'd 121

Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174.
The SIF correctly cites language from Roberts in which the Court holds both that an
administrative agency is limited to the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature and
that what power is delegated to the agency is primary and exclusive in the absence of a clear
expression of a contrary intent. The SIF then proceeds as though only the second of these two
holdings applies to it. Relying on this fallacious premise, it asserts the Manager must have
discretion over "how to" allocate an aggregate balance because he has broad discretion over
many matters that relate to the solvency of the fund.
There are two principal difficulties with this approach. First, it begs the question by
presuming that the Legislature gave the Manager discretion over how to proportion the aggregate
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRJEF - 4

balance. If, as demonstrated below, this power was never given, then the first prong of the
holding in Roberts (power is limited to what is granted), controls. Second, it depends upon the
use of present day circumstances to support an argument that the 1917 Legislature was not, with
respect to the proportioning of a balance, clearly expressing its intent to limit the Manager's
powers. The problem with this assertion is that there has been no showing that the 1917
Legislature knew of or had any reason to know of or even contemplate the present day
circumstances. When the Fund was created it was the only entity offering Worker's
Compensation Coverage and consequently the professed need to compete for business by
manipulating premiums to large policyholders was not on the minds of the drafters. Absent such
a showing, there is no reason to conclude that the 1917 Legislature could have anticipated a need
to be even more clear if its goal was to direct that any balance be distributed like any other
dividend (proportional based on premiums paid by time-qualified policyholders).
For these reasons, further discussion of Hayden Lake is a pointless exercise as nothing in
that case helps to resolve the question of whether the power to exercise discretion over how to
allocated an aggregate balance was ever given to the Manager.
C.

I.C. § 72-915 NOT ONLY AFFORDS THE MANAGER NO DISCRETION
OVER THE PROPORTIONING OF DIVIDENDS, IT CLEARLY SETS OUT A
DIVIDEND PROPORTIONING FORMULA IHATALLOWS NO EXERCISE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE MANAGER.

The SIF asserts that Plaintiffs ignore all ofI.C. § 72-915 except for the last few lines and
that this reading is deficient. To make this argument, the SIF is compelled to place undue
emphasis upon the first half of the sentence at issue and to do everything in its power to ignore
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and to distort the critical portion of the sentence.

3

In its direct challenge to Plaintiffs'

interpretation of the statute, the SIF points to two specific "flaws." Appellees' Brief, pp.14-15.
First, the SIF contends that the term "properly entitled to" (as used in the phrase " ... , such
proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to ... ") cannot be seen as defined by the
immediately following words "having regard to his prior paid premiums."

It appears that the

SIF perceives that "proper entitlement" necessarily implicates a discretionary determination
because "to receive a legal right or to qualify for a dividend (i.e. "entitled"), it must be suitable or
appropriate ("properly")." Appellees' Brief, p. 14.
Plaintiffs agree that a determination must be made to arrive at the proportion of the
dividend to which each otherwise qualified policyholder is entitled to receive. However, when
the lines at issue are read as a whole, it appears that Legislature has provided for a mathematical
proportioning based upon readily determinable information (number of qualified policyholders,
amount to be divided, time-qualified premiums paid by each) for the amount each policyholder is
properly entitled to receive. The proportional formula utilizing these factors reads:
Share of aggregate balance
Total aggregate balance

=

Premiums paid by each policyholders
Total premiums paid by policyholders

Thus, while a detennination must be made, there is no apparent need to read in a need for
discretion for the purpose of determining any of the factors or the outcome.
It should be noted that not only did the Legislature not articulate any determinative
factors or criteria which would necessitate a discretionary determination, but also that it failed to

3

In addition, the SIF discusses this first sentence ofl.C. § 72-915 and the effect of the
enactment ofl.C. § 41-1618 but it never explains how this sentence or its status are relevant to the
resolution of this matter. For this reason, Plaintiffs will not comment upon the SIF's claims that the
sentence has been mooted.
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identify any particular fact-finding that would trigger a discretionary detennination. This latter
omission is sufficient to render an attempt to read in "discretion" as an impennissible delegation
pursuant to Article 3, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. See, e.g. Boise Redevelopment
Agency v. Yick Kong Corp, 94 Idaho 876,885,499 P.2d 575,584 (1972). (The Legislature has

the responsibility to fix the conditions or events which trigger operation of a statute but it may
delegate to an agency the "fact-finding function" and the power to exercise discretion in deciding
to act once the given facts are found to be present). In the case of this statute, the Legislature
could have pennissibly identified a fonnula with factors that required a fact-finding process to be
performed by the Manager or it could have identified other criteria, which if found to be present,
would trigger a discretionary determination. As the Legislature did neither of these things, it is
not possible to read into this statute a constitutional delegation of discretion.
Second, the SIF has challenged Plaintiffs' reading of the statute for the reason that it
creates an "absurd" result.

Specifically, the SIF contends that the SIF will be compelled to pay

policyholders who suffered losses a share of the dividends (effectively a retroactive premium
reduction). The SIF never explains anything to support the reasoning that "fairness" compels
that policyholders who suffered losses be excluded from sharing in dividends and, as a
consequence, have to pay a greater premium than everyone else. Appellees' Brief, p.15.
In making this assertion, the SIF ignores an alternative reasonable conceptualization, the
existence of which causes the SIF's view to be irrelevant to the construction and application of
the statute. Westway Constr., Inc., v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 73 P.3d 721 (2003).
(If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not

judicial). Beyond this, the SIF's own view is in direct conflict with other provisions of the law
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both as it was enacted in 1917 and as it currently exists.
Insurance is a system in which, for a fee, the insurance company assumes the
responsibility to pay all losses. In such a system, there is no expectation that the premium
collected from any one insured will, over time, pay the losses suffered by that insured. Instead,
the system works because careful underwriting by the company allows it to know that, over time,
the premiums collected from all insureds will cover the losses suffered by individual insureds,
together with operating expenses and all proper surpluses and profits. Viewed in this context, if
the SIF has collected too much premium for the risks for which it has assumed responsibility, say
5% too much, then it has overcharged every single policyholder by that very same 5% for its
agreement to pay the losses. The fact that some may have suffered losses does not change the
fact that all were overcharged for the benefit of being relieved of the risk of loss. Even if it is
reasonable to argue that where everyone has overpaid for insurance, those on whose behalf
claims were paid should be treated differently, the decision to reduce everyone's premium
proportionally is not patently absurd.
Moreover, the SIF's concept that those who suffer losses should pay more than those who
do not suffer losses, flies in the face of Section 93, Assessments, Chapter 81 of the 1917 Idaho
Session Laws. 4 That provision clearly provides that if total losses for a class exceed the
premiums collected for that class, then all members of the class are to be assessed. This
approach to assessments is logically consistent with the concept that the premium to be paid by
each policyholder is based upon the risk represented by the entire class and not upon the losses

4

See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek In Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Response To The
Memorandum of State Insurance Fund In Support oflts Motion for Summary Judgment, 11/7/07 for
complete copy of Chapter 81, Idaho Session Laws (herein after Aff.Lojek11/07/07).
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suffered by any individual class member.
The role of assessments in the 1917 Act (allowed) and in the current law (no longer
allowed) renders irrational the argument that I. C. § 72-915 should be read to allow the
disproportionate allocation of dividends utilized by the Manager. A disproportionate allocation
of dividends based upon losses is, in reality, a form of assessment. Some policyholders are
paying more premium than others though they are all part of the same risk pool and the SIF's
justification for such an unauthorized or illegal assessment is that they suffered losses.
Given that there is a logic and consistency to the Legislature's failure to allow for the
consideration of individual losses, the fact that there may be arguments to support such
consideration in the allocation of an aggregate balance is insufficient to support a challenge to the
statutory scheme which is consistent in giving no consideration to individual losses. Westway

Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, supra., Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103,105, 785 P.2d 667,
669 (1989) (absent absurdity, ambiguity, or conflict with other statutes, there is no occasion for
judicial construction of a statute).
D.

NEITHER THE SIF NOR THE DISTRlCT COURT HAVE SUCCESSFULLY
IDENTIFIED A SINGLE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE READING WHICH
WOULD RENDER THE STATUTE AMBIGUOUS.

In addition to challenging the Plaintiffs' reading of the statute based upon the claims
discussed above, the SIF argues that the statute is ambiguous. In this regard, the SIF asserts both
that the District Court properly found an ambiguity in the LC. § 72-915 and that the statute can
reasonably be read as providing the Manager with discretionary authority over both the "whether
to" and "how to" questions associated with paying a dividend pursuant to the statute. Appel!ees'
Brief, p. 20.
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While the SIF asks this Court to uphold the findings of the District Court, it appears to
make no attempt in the Appel!ees' Brief to justify one of the District Court's three interpretations
of the statute. Therefore, it is unclear whether the SIF acknowledges that one of the three
readings posed by District Court is, in fact, unreasonable or whether the SIF agrees with the
District Court and did not, in the interest of adhering to page limitations, discuss the matter.
Given this lack of clarity, the Plaintiffs will proceed to address the District Court's specific
findings and with respect to the reading on which the District Court and the SIF clearly agree,
respond directly to the claims set out in Appellees' Brief.
1.

Applicable Legal Standards

Before undertaking this examination, it is useful to have in mind certain principles which
guide the process of reading a statute to discern its meaning. The process begins with an analysis
of the literal meaning of the language.

Where the statute clearly expresses but one permissible

intent, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no
occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Ada County Assessor v. Roman
Catholic Diocese a/Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428,849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). When, based on
analysis of the "literal language of the enactment," reasonable minds attempting to "derive the
intent of the legislative body that adopted the act" can conclude that the language appears to
express two or more legislative intentions. Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of
Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999).

However, a statute

is not rendered ambiguous "merely because an astute mind can devise more than one
interpretation ofit." Rim View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,823, 828 P.2d 848,852
(1992).
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRJEF • 10

Any evaluation of the intent expressed by the literal language of a statute, to be
reasonable, must be guided by certain basic principles. These principles do not, under any
authority that Plaintiffs can identify, include looking to any circumstances as they exist nearly
100 years after the enactment of the statute. Instead, in the process of evaluating the meaning of
the language the Court must:

I.

Look for an interpretation which gives meaning to every word, clause and
sentence of the statute should be given effect. In re Application/or Permit No. 367200, 121 Idaho 819,823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992).

2

Prefer meanings which are "plain, obvious, and rational" over "any curious,
narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the
ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 192, 191 P.2d 359,362

(1948) (citation omitted).
3.

Defer to the Legislature's intended meaning of a term in those instances where it
is apparent from the entire enactment that the Legislature intended a term to have
a particular meaning that is different from the literal meaning. Boyd v. Potlatch
Corp., 117 Idaho 960,961,793 P.2d 192,193 (Idaho 1990).

4.

Evaluate a statute which is part of a larger Act, not in isolation but rather in the
context of that Act and the related statutory and decisional law as it existed at the
time of that enactment. See, e.g. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378,382, 987 P.2d

290, 294 (1999).
5.

Consider the entire enactment (including definitions provided therein) and the law
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existing at the time of enactment, in the process of determining the meaning of the
statute. 5 Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 211-212, 76 P.3d 951,956
(2003).
6.

Assume, unless it is palpably absurd to do so, that the Legislature meant what it
said. Moses v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 118 Idaho 676,678, 799 P.2d 964, 966
(1990).
2.

Viewed in the light of the appropriate legal standard, none of the proffered
alternative readings of the Statute support the finding of ambiguity.

The District Court stated that:
" ... the language of!C. § 72-915 states that if the SIF manager deems that a dividend may
be safely made, "he may in his discretion, credit to each individual member ... such
portion of such balance as he may be properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid
premiums."
could reasonably be read in the following ways:

1.

" ... that if a dividend is declared by the fund Manager, every subscriber must
receive a share of the total amount of dividend in direct proportion to the amount
of premium that the subscriber paid as a percentage of the total premium paid by
all subscribers;"

2

" ... that the Manager could distribute the dividend as he has done in this case
because he has decided that giving regard to prior premiums paid, it is the larger
premium paying subscribers who are properly entitled to receive the dividend.";
and;

3.

" ... that every subscriber must receive a portion of the dividend but it does not
have to be in direct proportion to the amount of premium the subscriber paid

5

It is worth noting that unless statutory law is to take on an wholly organic nature which wonld
render the e intent of the legislature which enacted a statute irrelevant with the passage of time, the
construction of a statute in pari materia which looks to relevant statutes and case law must look to
material which was or could have been known to the legislature at the time it enacted the statute under
consideration.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRJEF - I 2

relative to the whole. Giving regard to the amount of premiums paid allows the
manager to give subscribers who paid a smaller premium less of a percentage than
the larger subscribers."
R. p. 87.
When the three competing readings of I. C. § 72-915 are examined in the light of
principles applicable to the process of discerning the meaning of a statute, it becomes apparent
that readings# 2 and# 3 cannot be seen as reasonable.

To begin with, there is a significant lack

of consistency between the readings. In readings # I and# 3 the words "each individual
member" are taken to mean "every" subscriber and, as a consequence, the Manager is afforded
no discretion over which policyholders are entitled to receive a share of the dividend. Then, in
reading # 2, the one favored by the SIF, the District Court, articulates a reading which affords the
Manager the discretion to read these words to mean "some" subscribers. Neither the District
Court nor the SIF ever explains how it is possible to reach the conclusion that words, which in
two out of three readings mean "every subscriber," can rationally be seen as meaning "some
subscribers" in the third reading.
Aside from this inexplicable inconsistency over the whether each subscriber means
"every subscriber" or just "some subscribers" who are deemed worthy by the Manager, readings
# 2 and # 3 share common and overriding flaws. Both fail to give any recognition of to the
long-established meaning of "dividend" which in common parlance signifies the well established
and uniformly-employed allocation calculus (to each pro rata based upon their respective
interest)°.

6

If A owns I 00 shares of GE and B owns 1000 shares, B will receive ten times the dividend paid
to A. Even a neophyte investor understands that this pro rata sharing of pay out is the means by which
"dividends" are allocated.
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Beyond these obvious problems, both entirely fail to account for the fact that the 1917
Legislature, acting in apparent recognition of this established calculus for allocating a divided,
saw fit to identify one and only one factor (amount of premium paid by each) to be given regard
in determining "such J:ITQPOrtion" of the available fund as to which each subscriber may be
properly entitled. The absence of any other articulated factors (e.g. policy marketing challenges,
costs of writing policies, etc.) to be incorporated in determining the amount due to each qualified
policyholder generates two hurdles to an attempt to justify either reading# 2 or reading# 3 as
"reasonable."
First, aside from the fact that the language directs a pro rata proportioning, an attempt to
read or infer into the statute discretion over the "how to" of dividend proportioning would be
contrary to the established law of this State. Such inferred discretion would lack either
articulated boundaries or articulated triggering events or fact-findings. Even ifit would be
reasonable to infer into this inferred discretion the duty to act consistent with the lawfully
imposed duties of the fund Manager, there is no means by which it is possible to identify the
circumstances which would trigger the exercise of discretion. The lack of clearly-identified
triggering events or triggering fact-finding would itself be an impermissible delegation of
legislative power. See, e.g. Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp, supra. Moreover,
as readings# 2 and # 3 involve discretionary power which has no identified boundaries and no
identified triggering events or fact-findings, a court would be unable to fulfil the judicial
responsibility to insure that the SIF was not acting impermissibly to "expand its own powers and
effectively amend statutes without legislative action." Kelso v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho
130,138,997 P.2d 591,599 (2000). Given the lack of proper constraints upon the discretion
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inferred into the statute by readings # 2 and # 3 neither can be seen as legal and, therefore, neither
can be seen as reasonable.
Second, while the Legislature used clear language to identify all of the factors which are
associated with a typical dividend distribution (a fund, a qualified group and one factor upon
which to apportion the fund among the group) it did not use any language which identifies any
factors which would be part of any other calculus

The District Court did not point to any

language in the "how to" portion of the statute which supported the inference of other factors or
of a calculus other than pro rata. As will be discussed below under separate headings, the SIF
attempts to fill this void by devising strained and unreasonable readings of the words "properly,"
"properly entitled," and "may in his discretion" as they are used in LC. § 72-915.

a.

The word "properly" as it is used in IC.§ 72-915 generates a
need for a determination to be based upon a standard but it does
not authorize the exercise of discretion in the making of that
determination.

The parties are in agreement that "properly" is a word which means "suitably" or
"appropriately" and that it evokes a need to measure something against a standard so that
suitability can be determined. The dispute between them arises with respect to the yardstick to
be applied to gauge what is appropriate in each of the two instances in which the term is used in
the statute.
In the first instance, the word "properly" appears in the phrase which articulates the set of
circumstances which the Manager must find to be present before he can exercise discretion over
the question of "whether to" divide ru1 aggregate balance. (There must be a sum in the
accounting of premiums less expenses and losses which the Manager finds can be "safely and
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properly" divided).' Seeking to avoid the obvious conclusion that this usage of"properly" has no
bearing upon the "how to" portion of the statute, the SIF baldly asserts that the considerations of
"how to" allocate a dividend would be considered as a matter of discretion by the Manager
before he completed the process of determining that an aggregate balance existed which could be
safely and properly divided. Appellees' Brief, p.18-20.
This curious reading of the statute has two significant problems. First, it ignores a far
more simple and rational reading of LC.§ 72-915. When the section was enacted in 1917 and
until 1998, it included a provision requiring the Manager to maintain reserves and a surplus. Sec.
87, Ch 81, S.L.1917, later LC.§ 72-911. Currently, the Manager has the duty to effectuate
Board policies, LC. § 72-902, and the Board has the duty to adopt policies which ensure that the
SIF remains actuarially sound. LC.§ 72-901(3). The presence of these legally-imposed duties
easily explains the differentiation between "safe" (within the lawful authority of the Manager but
he does not deem it a good idea) and "proper" (not within lawful authority). As they are used in
LC.§ 72-911, these terms identify, consistent with established standards for lawful delegations of
discretion, the conditions which must be found to be present before the Manager can use his
discretion to elect whether or not to proceed to distribute an aggregate balance.
Second, the SIF's reading of the "whether to" part of the sentence would impermissibly
render all or at least a substantial portion of the "how to" part of the sentence superfluous. 8 If

7

Throughout the proceedings below, the parties did not appear to dispute the fact that the
term"safely," as used in this context, could properly be read to mean "without exposing the SIF to fiscal
danger."
8

The SIF has never taken a position upon whether the portion of the "how to" language which
establishes a longevity requirement for membership the group of policyholders who are part of"each
individual member of such class" is binding upon the Manager or subject to his discretion. It would be
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the intent of the 1917 Legislature had been to allow him to decide "how to" distribute the
aggregate balance before he decided whether to distribute it and to then to elect whether or not to
proceed with that decision, there wonld have been no need for the Legislature to direct the "who"
(to each individual"), the formula (proportionally) or a single factor to use in the formula (prior
paid premiums). The fact that the Legislature did say these things stands as a compelling
contradiction to the SIF attempt to rewrite the statute.
In the second instance, the word "properly" appears in the lengthy phrase which directs
the process once the Manager has exercised his discretion to proceed. At this point, the statute
directs that he "credit to each time-qualified individual:
such proportion of snch balance as he may be properly entitled to, having regard
to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates.
I.C. § 72-915 (emphasis added). In this instance, the term "properly" relates to the entitlement
of the entity which is antecedent of the pronoun "he." As the use of the term "he" follows most
closely upon the phrase "each individual member of such class [who satisfies a longevity
requirement]," it is apparent that the entity to which the use of the word "properly" relates is each
policyholder. Thus, the statute clearly states that the yardstick for measuring propriety
("properly entitled to, having regard to") is each policyholders' prior paid premiums. Thns, the
only thing that needs to be known to "properly" determine the entitlement ("such proportion of
such balance") due to each policyholder, is his proportionate share based upon prior paid
premiums. There is nothing in this usage of "properly" which supports a claim that the

curious if the SIF conceded that this language limits Manager as it does not perceive that any of the rest
of the language of the "how to" portion of the statute does limit him. However, whether this language is
binding or not, it does not appear to be necessary to include it in each paraphrasing of the statute or
phrasing of its meaning.
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Legislature intended that the allocation of an aggregate balance which the Manager had, in his
discretion elected to distribute, would turn upon consideration of any factors other than prior paid
premiums to be considered or involve any exercise of discretion.
b.

The words "may in his discretion" as it is used in IC. § 72-915 do
not authorize the exercise ofdiscretion over "how to" distribute a
dividend.

Perhaps appreciating the clarity of language dictating "how to" allocate an aggregate
balance, the SIF argues in favor of an extraordinary stretching of the application of the phrase
"may in his discretion" so that it becomes broad enough to cover not only the "whether to"
election but also all of" how to" language. By this means, the SIF seeks to morph the words
"credit to each individual member of such class" into "credit to some or all members of such
class," the singular qualifying factor (six month membership) into but one of many qualifying
factors and the words "properly entitled based upon prior paid premiums" into "properly entitled
based upon factors deemed appropriate by the Manager."
The argument appears to be premised upon the claim that "may in his discretion" is
redundant unless one reads the language such that "may" applies to the "whether to" decision and
"in his discretion" applies to everything that follows after the "whether to" decision is made.
There are a number of problems with this argument. First, it generates an impermissible grant of
discretion to ignore directive language without so much a stated limit or a triggering fact-finding.
Second, it ignores that the phrase is commonly used in statutes, regulations and court rules (over
200 in Idaho alone) for the apparent purpose of using the phrase "in [its or his] discretion" to
make clear that permission to act articulated by the word "may" is intended to tum upon
discretion and not upon some other factor.
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Third, it generates needless conflict within the section by conferring discretion over
things which, on the face of the language, are being directed and are fully executable without any
exercise of discretion. Some of this conflict is obvious ("each" would no longer means each).
Equally substantial (but less obvious) is the conflict which arises from the fact that the "how to"
language identifies a single factor (less then six months of membership) which limits "each" and
a single factor (prior paid premiums) which'is to be referred to in determining the proportional
share of each. Giving due deference to the principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the
identification of only one factor in each instance stands as very a compelling indication that the
Legislature did not intend for any other factors to be considered for the purpose of determining
the qualifications of or the share of policyholders entitled to a dividend once the Manager
decided to distribute an aggregate balance.
Having failed to deal with these problems, the SIF has not shown how it is reasonable to
read the phrase "may in his discretion" as affording the Manager discretion which turns on no
identified triggering fact-findings and is controlled by no stated limits. As the statute is written,
it does not matter whether the Manager thinks that is good or bad public policy. He has not been
given and cannot be given the discretion to determine that the word "each" means "some" and
that the rest of the clear language of the "how to" portion of the statute may be ignored.
3.

The phrase "classes of employment or industries as used in LC.§ 72-915
is not ambiguous.

The District Court (with the SIF's apparent concurrence) found that words "classes of
employment or industries" could allow for classification of employments based upon "industry,
by, size of employer, by premium amounts paid by employer, etc." R. p. 89. Consequently, the
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District Court found the language was ambiguous.
The terms "classes of employment or industries" and "class of employment or industry"
are neither ambiguous upon their face nor when considered in pari materia with the balance of
the Act adopted in 1917. Understanding the meaning of these terms is, however, necessary to
knowing the meaning of the phrase "each individual member of such class" as it is used in the
sentence articulating the dividend proportioning calculus established by the 1917 Legislature.
On its face, the term "classes of employment" cannot be read as referring to "classes of
employers" as in employers who pay less than $2,500 in annual premiums and employers who
pay more than $2,500. Even a casual reading of the provisions of LC.§ 72-915 makes it clear
that the statute anticipates the existence of a rating system in which rates are established based
upon "classes of employment and industries" and an accounting system in which a balance may
accrue to any "class of employment or industry." While it makes complete sense that rates and
accounting might be based upon the activities/class of the employee (secretary, laborer, etc) or
the industry (law practice, mining, etc.) it makes no sense at all that rates and accounting would
be based upon the amount of preminm paid by any given employer. If this were true, rates for the
coverage of secretaries would be based at least in part upon whether there is one secretary in the
office or hundreds.
Even if a system which rates risk based upon the amount of preminm paid does not seem
patently absurd, its irrationality becomes fully manifest when one refers to the provisions of
Section 90, Ch. 81, 1917 Idaho Session Laws, currently codified as LC.§ 72-913 (Classification
of risks and adjustments of premium) and Section 91, Ch. 81, 1917 Idaho Session Laws,
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currently codified as LC.§ 72-914 (Accounts). 9 These sections demonstrate that the roles of
"class" and "industry" are to permit employments to be grouped by the hazards associated with
the employment, for rates to be set based upon these hazards, for premiums to be set based upon
payroll (representing the number of persons at risk in that class of employment) and for accounts
to be kept as to premiums collected and claims paid so that if rates are too high or too low they
may be readjusted. To the extent that any question at all is left as to the meaning of"classes of
employment," it should be noted that the record is devoid of a single scrap of evidence to
demonstrate that rates are now or have ever been determined based upon the amount of premium
that an employer pays.

In view of the foregoing, it is not reasonable to see the term "classes of employment" as
ambiguous but, even if it were, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that it is rational to
read this term as including "classes of employers" based upon the amount of premium paid.
E.

THERE IS NO DEMONSTRATED JUSTIFICATION FOR ANY
CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT SHOWN TO BE
CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH THE ENACTMENTOFI.C. § 72-915.

The SIF persuaded District Court to evaluate the reasonableness of perceived competing
meanings of the statute based on statutes passed within the last 40 years, decisions entered by this
Court within the past decade, statutes and regulations of sister states adopted within the past
decade, a recent attorney general's opinion, and affidavits containing information about current
fund operational considerations (hereinafter "the information submitted by the SIF"). The SIF
now invites this Court to do likewise and to go even farther than the District Court went and to
find that not only does discretion over "how" to proportion exist, it has not been abused.

9

See, Aff. Lojek 11/07/07 for complete copy of Ch. 81, 1917 Idaho Session laws.
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This is a curious invitation given that in both of the first two cases cited by the SIF in its
discussion regarding statutory construction, the Courts made clear that the information to be
relied upon to interpret the meaning of a statute must relate to the time at which the statute was
enacted. Idaho Cardiology Assocs., P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223,225
108 Idaho P.3d 370,372 (2005). (The Legislature's intent is ascertained from the statutory
language and the Court may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and historical
content at enactment). In re Tax Appeal ofRoman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 429, 849
P.2d 98, 104 (1993). ( In an attempt to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature, the
Court seeks edification from the statute's legislative history and the contemporaneous context at
enactment).
The SIF never explains how, given these holdings, any of the information submitted by
the SIF is relevant to determining the meaning of I.C. § 72-915, a statute adopted in 1917. The
SIP appears to perceive support for its position in Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. 142
Idaho 804, 808, 134 P.3d 665 (2006). While the Court in that case did, after finding the language
ambiguous, look at the "reasonableness of the proposed construction," it did so with reference to
events contemporaneous with the adoption of the statute and never suggested that events 90 years
later would be or could be relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of a proposed construction.
Given the absence of any supporting case law, it seems that the assertion actually being
made is that the untested information submitted by the SIP demonstrates that the Manager has
not abused is discretion (not tested because it was not an issue up for determination by Summary
Judgment) and that absent an abuse of discretion, this Court should ignore any meaning of LC. §
72-915 that is inconsistent with his behavior. Putting aside this apparent invitation for the Court
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to shirk its responsibilities, the only thing that the SIF discusses as support for relying upon this
information seems to be "change in the law." This assertion turns upon the fact that in 1998 the
laws enabling the SIF were amended to create a Board to oversee and direct the Manager. While
it never does so directly and cites no authority for doing so, the SIF seems to be suggesting that
when the law changed in 1998, the meaning ofLC. § 72-915 changed.

Plaintiffs have been

unable to find any authority to support this contention.
Moreover, even if it could be said that changes in the SIF enabling law which have
occurred since 1917 could, on some basis, have a bearing upon the meaning of the language used
in LC.§ 72-915, there is no change so significant as to justify such a conclusion. In a somewhat
different vein, it has been held that subsequently enacted legislation can, in very limited
circumstances, work to repeal previously enacted legislation. See State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho
180, 187 250 P. 239,240 (Idaho 1926). (Repeal by implication is disfavored and will not be
indulged unless both statutes relate to the same subject and have the same object or purpose and
cannot be reconciled in any reasonable mam1er. Where there is a difference in the whole purview
of two statutes apparently relating to the same subject, the former is not repealed.)
There is nothing that has changed in the law regulating the SIF since 1917 which has any
bearing upon the resolution of this case. No statute enacted after 1917 which expressly deals
with dividends paid by the SIF to policyholders has been identified by any party or the District
Court. No statute, enacted after 1917 which expressly refers to LC.§ 72-915 or its predecessors
and which is irreconcilably inconsistent with the provision of that section pertaining to how a
dividend is to be proportioned has been identified by any party or the District Court. The SIF has
not shown that it is not possible for the Manager to fulfill any duty imposed upon him by the
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Legislature since 1917 and still honor the clear "how to" provisions of I.C. § 72-915. Indeed, it
does not appear that any materially different duty has been imposed upon the Manager or the
Board since 1917 (for example, the law has always required that the SIF be operated without
liability to the State, that the Manager conduct the business of the fund, that the Manager have
full authority over the fund and be entitled to do any and all of the things necessary and
convenient in the administration 10 thereof or in connection with the insurance business to be
carried on by him, Sections 75 and 77, Ch 81, 1917 Idaho Session Laws).
In sum, there appears to be no justification for any Court to look to any of the information
which the SIF has interjected into this record for the purpose determining the meaning ofI.C. §
72-915.
F.

THE SIF DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR SIMPLOT DEFERENCE.

The SIF has attempted to shoehorn its conduct into the protection afforded to statutory
interpretations made by state agencies charged with the administration of the laws adopted by the
Legislature. This assertion is not supported by the applicable case law.
The SIF correctly states that the first prong of the test for Simplot deference requires that
entity be a state agency which has been entrusted to administer the statute at issue. The SIF falls
short on this criteria in two respects. First, to qualify for deference, the entity must be a state
agency. In Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, supra., the Court noted that the
District Court had found that the SIF was not a state agency. This Court relied upon this finding
as partial justification for its holding that the District Court correctly ruled that the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act did not preclude judicial adjudication the plaintiffs claims.

10

Of course, this authority cannot be read as itself justifying a violation of the enabling statute.
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Hayden Lake, 138 Idaho at 400, 111 P.3d at 85.
In addition, the agency, to be seen as administering a statute, must be empowered to
make rules and regulations. See, e.g. Pearl v. Ed. ofPro.fl Discipline of the Idaho State Ed. of
Med., 137 Idaho 107, 113 (Idaho 2002). The only rule-making power afforded to the Manager or
the Fund appears in LC.§ 72-903(d) which authorized the Manager to make rules about record
destruction. The role of the SIF is one of execution, acting as a proprietary entity, and not one of
administration acting as a governmental entity. The SIF offers no case or statute to support its
claim that the Manager is empowered to administer the statute, as opposed to administer the SIF
and has wholly failed to establish that even the first prong of the criteria for Simplot deference is
satisfied.
The second prong requires that the interpretation put forward by a qualified agency must
be reasonable. In applying this requirement, the Court has indicated that an agency interpretation
could not be deferred to where it was obscure and doubtful. Preston v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,
131 Idaho 502, 505, 960 Idaho 185, 189 (Idaho 1998). For reasons discussed above it is the
Plaintiffs' position that the SIF's interpretation of the statute is both obscure and doubtful and,
therefore, that it not to be afforded deference.
The third prong requires that the interpretation put forward by a qualified agency must not
pertain to a matter which is expressly dealt with by statutory language. As discussed above, it is
apparent that LC.§ 72-915 clearly and expressly details the steps to be taken and the provisions
relating to the "how to" distribute a dividend are fully executable without any interpretation by
rule or regulation or exercise of discretion by the Manager.
As the SIF cannot meet one, let alone all three of the primary prongs, of the test, it is not
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necessary to engage in an analysis of whether the rationals underlying the rule are present. J.R.

Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Idaho 1991).

ill. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the SIF has failed to identify a
single justification which is logically and reasonably sufficient to prevent this Court from finding
as a matter of law that:
1.

That LC. § 72-915 clearly and unambiguously expresses a legislative intent
relative to the method to be employed for allocation of any amount which the
Manager, in his discretion, determines should be distributed as dividend; and,

2.

That the Legislature intended by the language it used in LC § 72-915 to provide
that, after excluding policyholders who do not meet the longevity requirement and
who are not within the classes of employments sharing in the dividend, any
dividend which is declared must be distributed among all remaining policyholders
in direct proportion to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period,
i.e., on a pro rata basis.

Accordingly, the relief sought by Appellants is for a remand to the district court with the
above findings clearly stated for the district court's guidance so the application ofl.C. § 72-915
can then be addressed.
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